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The aim of this paper lies in providing a unified analysis of the 
meanings of the connective but in English and their counterpart particles 
in Korean. The two meanings of but, i.e., contrast and denial of expection, 
are accounted for in terms of a unitary approach in which the two 
meanings are argued to have the same core meaning differing from each 
other in the amount of inference necessary to derive the representation on 
which the connective operates. The representations are figuratively shown 
by means of scales of meaning. Korean examples are also examined to 
show that Korean employs more complex methods of representing the 
relations between various meanings of but. 
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1. Introduction 
The meaning conveyed by the connective but is generally classified 
into two types, which are illustrated by the following examples: 
(1) a. Tom is tall but Bill is short. 
b. He got up early but he missed the train. 
The first type is dubbed semantic opposition (Lakoff, 1971), contrast use 
(Blakemore, 1987, 1989), or external but (Halliday & Hasan, 1976), whereas 
the second is called denial of expectation (Lakoff, 1971; Blakemore, 1987, 
1989) or internal but (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). While Lakoff assumes this 
distinction to be a semantic one, Dascal & Katriel (1977) and Blakemore 
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(1987) argue that the two interpretations can be derived from a single 
meaning with reference to the context. In particular, Blakemore (1987) 
develops a unified analysis of the two uses of but and claims that but in 
both uses fun~tions as a semantic constraint on relevance by guiding the 
hearer to interpret the proposition but introduces as being contrasted to 
the previous one (contrast use) or to a derived proposition (denial of 
expectation use)_ That is, the meaning of but is explained in tandem with 
her analysis of discourse connectives. It is also the case that but can 
connect two utterances that differ in their speech acts. 
It is generally assumed that the meaning of but consists of and 
+something else, while the something else part does not contribute to the 
truth-conditional content of the utterance because the truth-value of the 
utterance connected by but would be decided depending on those of the 
two constituent propositions. Blakemore (1987), however, contends that 
but does not have and as part of its meaning in either use, because the 
sole function of but is to constrain the interpretation of the utterance it 
introduces in the specific context in which the interpretation of the 
preceding utterance is already made. In her later article (1989), this view 
is revised as to admit that at least in contrast use, but has and as part of 
its meaning_ Contra Blakemore (1987, 1989), I argue that but has and as 
part of its meaning in both uses, i.e. contrast use and denial of 
expectation use, by providing some grammatical or syntactic evidence. 
There is at least one more use of but that does not seem to be 
replaceable by and. 
(2) A: Shut the door. 
B: O. K, but don't give me orders. (Dascal & Katriel, 1977, p. 149) 
As we can observe, (2) involves two different speech acts: a stating and a 
request, which is believed not to be possible in and-conjunction. 
However, contra this common belief, and also has a discoursal function 
as in the following example. 
(3) I don't like that. And, is he accepting it? (Schiffrin, 1987, p. 38) 
It has been argued elsewhere that when and is used as a discourse 
connective, the propositions connected are not necessarily of equal status 
(Lee, 2002a, 2002b). That implies that there is a possibility that and can 
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connect two sentences that differ in speech acts. Therefore, I argue that 
cases like (2) do not constitute genuine counter-examples to the claim 
that but has and as part of its meaning. 
I also hope to argue that in these three uses, the core meaning of but 
is contrast. (See e.g., Fraser & Malamud-Makowski, 1996; Fraser, 1998.) The' 
difference between them lies in the level of representation in which the 
contrast occurs. That is, in the case of contrast use, the contrast occurs 
between the given propositions, whereas in the case of the denial of 
expectation use, the level on which the contrast occurs involves derived 
propositions. As we will see, the denial of expectation use requires more 
inference from the interlocutors than the contrast use. 
I will also discuss Korean examples to show the different lexicalization 
of the scale of meaning. It will be shown that Korean employs more 
complex methods to represent the common properties of various senses of 
but. 
2. Contrast Use of but 
A typical example of contrastive use of but could be illustrated by the 
following: 
(4) (=1) Tom is tall but Bill is short. 
The lexical items tall and short form a seman,tic relation of antonymy 
that intrinsically entails the relation of contrast. According to Lyons 
(1977), the sense-relation that is called contrast involves various kinds, 
depending on the criteria of classification: binary vs. non-binary, gradable 
vs. ungradable, orderly vs. non-orderly, and so on. The example in (4) 
represents one of the many possibilities in which the notion of contrast is 
manifested Here are some more possibilities that involve contrast 
between lexical items: 
(5) a. John gave toys to Mary: but Sara gave dolls to Jane. 
b. The cook fried the onions, but she steamed the cabbage. 
c. The WFL is a pretty good deal, [ ... ] But the NFL is everybody's 
dream and few make it there. (Fraser, 1998, p. 310) 
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Here we can note that lexical items in each example comprise a contrast 
set: <toys, dolls ... > in (Sa), <frying, steaming, ... > in (Sb), and < ... , good 
deal, everybody's dream> in (Se). The contrast occurs with reference to 
certain criterion. For example, the lexemes toys and dolls in (Sa) contrast 
with each other in terms of things that the children are supposed to play 
with. Similarly, lexemes frying and steaming in (Sb) are contrasted in 
terms of the way of cooking. In some cases, the lexical items may not 
constitute a strict semantic contrast set as in (Se). However, the set is 
somewhat accommodated by means of widening the scope of the notion 
of contrast according to the context (Hirschberg, 1985, 1991). 
Concerning the so-called contrast use of but, I argue that as long as 
there are lexical items that can constitute a set of contrast, the default 
interpretation would be that of contrast use. In the case of (4), the 
contrast set would be something like <short, of average height, tall>. 
However, in some contexts, examples like (4) can be read as denial of 
expectation cases. For example, in a situation where Tom and Bill are 
brothers, we normally expect that if one of the siblings is tall, then the 
other tends to be tall as well. So, from the first conjunct of (4), we can 
reason the following: 
(6) a. If Tom is tall, Bill is talL (Premise) 
b. Bill is tall. (Conclusion) 
However, the conclusion in (6b) contradicts the second conjunct of (4). 
Analyzed this way, example (4) might be taken to be a case of denial of 
expectation, because a proposition derived from the first conjunct 
contrasts with the second conjunct. Though this kind of analysis is 
possible, it still seems to be likely that (4) is taken to be a contrast case 
by default. 
It seems to be sometimes the case that the reading of but-constructions 
depends on some grammatical or syntactic factors, such as the identity of 
the subject, which also provides evidence that the two uses share the 
meaning of contrast. Let me examine the following pair: 
(7) a. His father owns a mini, but a Porsche as welL 
b. His father owns a mini, but mine owns a Porsche. 
The pair in (7) is alike except for the subjects. That is, the subjects of two 
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conjuncts in (7a) are the same, while those in (7b) are different. This 
factor seems to affect the reading of the but-construction. As for (7a), 
from the first clause, we may derive an assumption that his father is 
poor. However, the interpretation of the second clause enables us to deny 
that assumption and to have the belief that he is rich. In this way, his 
father in (7a) comes to have one value in terms of wealth. Analyzed this 
way, (7a) should be a case of denial of expectation. In contrast, when two 
entities are involved as in (7b), the sequence tends to have the reading of 
contrast use. In the following section, the denial of expectation case will 
be addressed. 
3. Denial of Expectation Use of but 
Denial of expectation use of but refers to those cases in which the 
speaker denies a proposition that is derivable from the propositional 
content of the utterance just mentioned as in the following example. But 
in this use has a so-called cancellative function, i.e. it cancels assumptions 
derivable from the preceding proposition. (Bell, 1998) 
(8) John is tall, but he's no good at basketball. 
In (8), there is no pair of contrasted words that might have provided a 
reading towards the default contrast use. What is denied in the second 
conjunct is a proposition or an assumption that is derivable from the first 
conjunct. The hearer of (8) is believed to have access to the following 
reasoning and can derive a proposition that is a target for denying in the 
second conjunct: 
(9) If John is tall, he is good at basketball. 
The propositions derivable from the first conjunct could vary in their 
nature . .In fact, the selection of the proposition is constrained by the 
propositionaL content of the second conjunct introduced by but. 
Blakemore (1987) contends that discourse connectives such as but have 
the role of constraining the interpretation of the utterance they introduce. 
However, it seems that discourse connectives also constrain the 
interpretation of the preceding utterance, as we can observe in the 
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analysis of (9): the connective or the content it introduces makes us do 
the reasoning in (9). Furthermore, it seems that the connective but or the 
proposition it introduces has a much more active role in constraining the 
way the first clause is interpreted. A sentence-based approach would not 
account for this phenomenon properly. This claim is evidenced by the 
variety of propositions that are derivable from the first proposition. 
Let me illustrate the variety of the propositions that are derivable from 
the first coniunct depending on the context. As in (9), the derived 
proposition has the nature of common knowledge, i.e. tall people are 
normally good at basketball. Sometimes the derived proposition displays 
the propositional attitude of the speaker. Propositional attitudes refer to 
beliefs, doubt, intention, etc. towards a proposition. 
(10) Tom is a dancer but he is not gay. 
In a situation where the hearer of (10) is not aware of or not interested 
in the speaker's propositional attitude about the sexuality of male 
dancers, utterance (10) reveals it, and it can be phrased as in (11). 
(11) The speaker believes that all male dancers are gay. 
What is negated in the second coniunct in (10) is a proposition that Tom 
is gay, which in turn can be derived from the first coniunct of (10) and 
the belief in (11) by a series of reasoning as follows: 
(12) a. All male dancers are gay (Premise) 
b. Tom is a male dancer. (Premise) 
c. Tom is gay. (Conclusion) 
Obviously the proposition that all male dancers are gay does not have the 
nature of common knowledge. This example also shows how the 
interpretation of the first coniunct is constrained by the interpretation of 
the second coniunct. 
In some cases, the contrast occurs between the derived propOSitions of 
the two coniuncts. Note that in the preceding two examples (8) and (10), 
what is contrasted is a derived proposition of the first coniunct and the 
propositional content of the second coniunct. There is one more possibility 
in which the contrast occurs. 
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(13) He is in the office, but he is busy. 
Let us assume that (13) is uttered by a secretary of a boss to a visitor. By 
hearing the first conjunct, the visitor will derive a proposition that the 
boss will see the visitor, which does not contrast with the explicit content 
of the second conjunct introduced by but. However, we can derive an 
assumption from the second conjunct that can be a candidate for the 
contrast with this derived proposition. That is, we can derive an 
assumption that the boss will not see the visitor from the proposition 
that the boss is busy. Thus, the contrast occurs on the level of derived 
assumptions rather than that of the expressed propositions. In cases like 
this, it is quite clear that the interpretation of each conjunct is dependent 
on that of the other in a specific context. 
Another example of this type comes from Dascal and Katriel (1977, 
p. 144). 
(14) (In the context: A and B are discussing the economic situation 
and reach the conclusion that they should hear the opinion of a 
specialist in economic affairs.) 
A: John is an economist. 
B: John is not an economist, but he is a businessman. 
The first conjunct of B's utterance makes available the assumption that 
John should not be consulted, while the second one involves an opposite 
assumption that John should be consulted. Here again the contrast occurs 
between the two derived propositions. 
What is common to both the contrast use of but and the denial of 
expectation use of but is that there is a contrast between two 
propositions. In the former use, the contrast occurs between the explicit 
propositional contents of the two conjuncts, while in the latter use, the 
contrast is either between a derived implicit assumption and an explicit 
content or between two derived implicit assumptions. As I claimed in 
Introduction, this does not warrant a two-way distinction between the 
contrast use and the denial of expectation use. Firstly, as we have 
examined, the same sequence can be interpreted in both ways depending 
on the context or the grammatical factors, which makes it untenable to 
maintain the binary distinction. Secondly, the contrast occurs between 
propositions whether the propositions are expressed ones or derived ones. 
1264 Lee, Hye-Kyung 
4. But as a Discourse Connective 
The cases like (I5) have been mentioned at the beginning of this papeL 
(15) (=2) A: Shut the door. 
B: OK, but don't give me orders. 
That is, but can connect two sentences that differ in their speech acts. 
Here are some more examples_ 
(16) A: Don't you see that the door is open? 
B: I'm not blind, but if you want me to close it, why don't you 
say so straight out? (Dascal & Katriel, 1977, pp. 15S-159) 
(17) A: Aren't we late? 
B: We are, but let's go quickly. 
B's utterances in above examples contain, as the second conjunct,' a 
request in (15), a question in (16), and a proposal in (In The examples do 
not involve any lexical items that might lead to a contrast reading. 
However, I argue that they can be construed as communicating denial of 
expectation and accordingly involving contrast 011 the level of derived 
propositions. If my analysis is on the right track, then we can have a 
unitary approach to the connective but. Let us examine the above 
examples in turn. 
First, (15B) as a whole can receive the following analysis from A's 
perspective: 
(IS) a. If B says it's okay, then he is accepting my order and my 
power over him. 
b. If B asks me not to give him orders, then he is not accepting 
my order and my power over him. 
The resultant clauses in (ISa) and (ISb) that are derived from the first 
conjunct and the second conjunct of (15B) respectively, are contrasted 
with each otheL Hence (15B) as a whole can be regarded as a case of 
denial of expectation, the contrast lying in two derived propositions. 
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Examples (16) and (17) can also be given a similar analysis. The hearers 
of (16B) and (17B) might perform the following kinds of reasoning: 
(19) a. If B says he is not blind, he does not understand my intention 
to communicate through an indirect speech act. 
b. If B asks me to say straight out, he understands my intention 
to communicate through an indirect speech act. 
(20) a. If B says we are late, he thinks we'd better not go. 
b. If B suggests that we should, he thinks we'd better go. 
The consequent clauses in (19a) and (19b) contradict each other. Again, 
we can observe that the contrast occurs on the level of derived 
propositions from the two given utterances. The same argument applies 
to the analysis given in (20). 
Therefore, I argue that examples in (15), (16), and (17) are denial of 
expectation cases and therefore contrast cases. The difference between the 
apparent three uses lies in the amount of inference involved in deriving 
the proposition on which the contrast occurs. 
I am going to represent the various meanings discussed up to now on 
the scale of meaning. The nature of scale of meaning has been discussed 
elsewhere (Lee, 2002a, 2002b). Briefly, the scale has two ends, one of 
which is logical meaning and the other is inferential meaning. Here, the 
logical meaning refers to the meaning that has the same function as that 
in first-order logic. On the other hand, inferential meaning is used to 
indicate whatever functions a connective has apart from its logical 
connection. The most crucial assumption concerning the scale of meaning 
is that the further the position of a connective is to the right end of the 
scale, the more inferencing is needed. Let me represent the various 
meanings of but by means of a scale. 
Figure 1. The Scale of but in English 
Inference 
but contrast I derual of expectation discoursal 
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5. Truth-Conditional Relevance of but 
As mentioned in Introduction, Blakemore (1987) argues that but does 
not have and as part of its meaning even though the sentence connected 
by but as a whole can be placed in the scope of logical operators such as 
if-then construction, which is generally used as a diagnostics for truth-
conditionality of meaning. 
(21) If Susan is coming but lane is not, then I shall cancel the lecture. 
(Blakemore, 1987, p. 140). 
(21) shows that the proposition, Susan is coming but Jane is not, as a 
whole is embedded into the scope of the if clause, although the contrast 
meaning conveyed by but does not seem to affect the assessment of the 
truth-value. Hence, but has the role of conjoining the two utterances as 
and does. 
To support her argument, Blakemore suggests that there is a 
discrepancy between syntactic form and propositional form. That is, the 
syntactic representation does not necessarily reflect the propositional form. 
This claim seems to be supported by examples such as the following: 
(22) a. If you want to leave, you really want to' leave, then I'll let you. 
b. If you do this: turn left at the church, then you'll get there in 
five minutes. (due to Deirdre Wilson) (Blakemore, 1987, p. 141) 
According to Blakemore, as we have examples such as (22) in which the 
antecedent does not form a conjoined proposition, the fact that the 
sentence connected by but can fall under scope of the logical operator as 
in (21) does not necessarily guarantee that it is a conjunction. 
Contra Blakemore's claim, examples like (22) do not seem to support 
her argument. As Rouchota (1990) points out, even though the antecedent 
of (22a) is not a conjoined proposition, the utterances in the antecedent 
are identical in their propositional content. In (22a), the second utterance 
of the antecedent is used to emphasize the content of the preceding one 
by adding really. Thus, they are identical as far as the propositional 
content is concerned. Similarly, in (22b), the second utterance of the 
antecedent is a mere specification of the content of this in the preceding 
Contrast, Denial and Negation 1267 
utterance. In contrast, the content in the antecedent of (21) conveys two 
different processes. Hence, I would claim that the antecedent in (21) and 
those in (22) should not be discussed in a similar vein, because they are 
essentially different from each other in terms of the number of 
propositions they convey. 
The examples in (22) might be amended to avoid reinforcement or 
specification so that Blakemore's argument concerning the discrepancy 
between the syntactic form and the propositional form might be 
evidenced. However, the existence of discrepancy should not be 
overgeneralized to include cases like (21) in which it is clearly shown 
that but has and as part of its meaning. As was mentioned in a 
preceding section, Blakemore herself admits in her later work (Blakemore, 
1989) that at least in the contrast use, but has and as part of its meaning. 
She goes on to say that the speaker is understood to have presented a 
single conjoined proposition. However, I do not think this argument is 
convincing, because in some cases it is hard to distinguish the contrast 
use and denial of expectation use. Given this fact, it seems untenable to 
argue that only contrast but has and as part of its meaning. 
Furthermore, it also seems possible that the contrast meaning of but 
itself might contribute to the truth-conditional content of what is said. An 
utterance like (23) might happily be used in a situation below: 
(23) (Context: A gang of robbers are discussing the robbery of a house 
for which two people are needed, one of whom should be tall and 
the other short) 
It is not the case that Tom is tall but Bill is short. It is the case 
that Tom is tall and Bill is short. So let's send Tom and Bill this 
time. 
Let me conclude this section by discussing cases that involve different 
speech acts. The question to be addressed is whether it is still the case 
that but in that use has and as part of its meaning. I have contended 
that but in this use is similar to and in a discourse use, in that both can 
connect propositions with unequal status. As but in this use would 
occupy a place near the inferential end, it does not have to retain the 
logical property. That is, it has less logical meaning of and than the 
contrast use does. Hence, whether but has and as part of its meaning 
does not matter in this use. 
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6. Contrast, Correction, and Another Dimension of Meanings 
of but 
It has been noted in the studies of contrastive connectives that some 
languages employ distinct connectives for two different kinds of but 
connection, which are called concessive and contrastive but conjunctions 
by Horn (1985). The two are illustrated by the following examples, (24) 
being repeated from (14). 
(Context: A and B are discussing the economic situation and reach 
the conclusion that they should hear the opinion of a specialist in 
economic affairs.) 
(24) A: John is an economist. 
B: He is not an economist, but he is a businessman. 
(25) A: He is an economist. 
B: He is not an economist, but a businessman. 
In the same situation, (24B) and (2SB) induce quite different interpre-
tations. As for (24B), it has been discussed above that (24B) implies that 
John's opinion is worth consulting, because even though John is not an 
economist, he is a businessman. On the other hand, (25B) implies that 
there is no point of hearing John's opinion, because John is not an 
economist. 
Even though the two uses are realized by the same lexical item in 
English, some languages employ different lexical items for these two uses, 
e.g. aval and ela in Hebrew, pero and si no in Spanish, aber and sondern 
in German, and -ciman and -ko or -la in Korean. It is true that English 
uses the same lexical item for these two, but there is some syntactic 
difference in these uses. That is, when used for the concessive meaning 
as in (24), the second conjunct takes the form of a full sentence, whereas 
in the contrastive conjunction as in (25), only the contrasted element is 
presented after the connective but. Alternatively, the contrastive 
conjunction can be manifested by means of juxtaposition as in the 
following: 
(26) He is not an economist. He is a businessman. 
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We can notice the second conjuncts in (24B) and (25B) play quite 
different roles in our interpretation of the utterance. The role of the 
second clause of (24B) is as discussed, i.e. it has the role of denying or 
cancelling a derived assumption from the first conjunct. It is normally the 
case that the derived assumption from the second clause is perceived to 
be salient or correct by, the interlocutors, unless the context tells 
otherwise. On the other hand, the second clause of (25B) has the role of 
providing an alternative to the negated element in the first clause. One of 
the grammatical characteristics of this use is that the first conjunct 
always carries the negative particle, though this is not a sufficient 
condition. Let me call but in this use the corrective but. At the same 
time, the second conjunct seems to provide further rectification for a 
derived proposition from the first conjunct (Rouchota, 1990) For example, 
in the context in which (25B) is uttered, the content in the first clause 
allows us to derive a conclusion that John should not be consulted. The 
content in the second clause supports this conclusion further by 
providing the fact that he is a businessman whose opinion is not worth 
being consulted. 
Horn (1985) claims that the contrastive environment shown in (25B) 
tends to be employed for metalinguistic negation (MN henceforth). MN 
refers to negation in such properties of an utterance as presupposition, 
implicature, phonology, morphology, style, register and so on rather than 
on the truth-conditional content of the utterance. The following is a 
typical example of MN. 
(27) I did not see two MONGEESE, I saw two MONGOOSES. 
Here, what is negated is not the proposition that the speaker saw two 
mongooses, but the plural form of the word mongoose. Horn's claim is 
based on the fact that in MN the constituent in the second clause is 
proposed as the appropriat~ substitution. In that respect, corrective 
negation in (25B) and MN share a common property. From a syntactic 
point of view, MN in English occurs in the same syntactic environments 
as the corrective use of but. 
(28) a. It isn't hot, but scalding. 
b. It isn't hot- it's scalding. 
c. #It isn't hot, but it is scalding. 
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(29) a. We don't have three children, but four. 
b. We don't have three children- we have four. 
c. tfWe don't have three children, but we (do) have four. 
(Horn, 1985, p. 166) 
With these facts, I contend that there is another dimension of the 
meaning of but, which again ranges from logical conjunction to 
inferential connection. The nature of inference involved in this scale is to 
be distinct from that involved in the scale discussed in the preceding 
sec tion: it is towards a metalinguistic reading. It cannot be tested which 
dimension requires more inference, but I can say that the nature of the 
inference involved in the two dimensions must be distinct. Hence, the 
scale of but in English can be revised as follows: 
Figure 2. The Scale of but in English (revised) 
Inference 
but contrast denial of expectation discoursal 
correcti ve ! metalinguistic ! 
I do not have any explanation for the ordering between the denial of 
expectation use and the corrective use. In the mean time, it should be 
noted that the corrective use involves denotational rather than 
metalinguistic value. The similarity between the correcti ve use and the 
metalinguistic use is captured by the new dimension. 
In English or French, the two dimensions can be covered by the same 
connective. Still, English employs syntactic devices to convey the 
difference of the two dimensions. As Horn (1985, p. 169) suggests, 
however, the syntactic devices in English are not absolute in the sense 
that the deviant marked examples such as (28c) and (29c) can be 
rendered acceptable when the context is properly given. For example, 
Suppose that you have announced that you are looking for people 
with three children (to fill out a questionnaire, for example, or to 
offer aid and solace); then, if I assume that having four children 
qualifies me almost as well (or even better), I can nominate myself 
by uttering the suddenly redeemed A4b [=29c)]. (ibid.) 
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This quotation suggests that the linguistic devices to represent the two 
distinct scales might not be absolute. Korean uses two different suffixes 
to represent the two dimensions in Figure 2. Let me discuss the 
distributional differences between the two suffixes in the following 
section. 
7. Contrastive Connectives in Korean 
There are various contrastive or concessive connectives in Korean: -na, 
-eta, -taman, -nuntey, -nunteyta, and -ciman. Among those, I am going 
to deal with -na and -ciman. The contrast use of but and the denial of 
expectation use can be translated as these two connectives as we can see 
in the following: 
(30) thorn-un khu-na/-ciman pil-un cak-ta. 
Tom-Top tall-but Bill-Top small-DC 
'Tom is tall, but Bill is short.' 
(31) a. ku-nun samwusil-ey iss-una/-ciman pappu-ta. 
He-Top office-in be-but busy-DC 
'He is in the office, but he is busy.' 
b. thorn-un mwuyongswu-i-na/-ciman keyi-ka an-i-ta. 
Tom-Top dancer-be-but gay-NM not-be-DC 
'Tom is a dancer but he is not gay.' 
Whether the contrast is explicit as in (30) or implicit as in (31), the 
contrast meaning can be conveyed by these two connectives. 
However, the following example shows a divergence between these two 
connectives: 
(32) ne-to al-kyess-?una/-ciman ku salam-un mopsi aph-a. 
you-too know-SUP-but that person-Top very sick-DC 
'Although you also may know, that man is very sick.' 
It is not clear to what cqtegory the above example is assigned, but it can 
be assumed that it involves a denial of expectation use if we have the 
following analysis: 
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(33) a. If the hearer already knows, the speaker doesn't need to say 
that that man is very sick. 
b. The speaker says that that man is very sick. 
The resultant clause of (33a) and (33b) contrast with each other. That is 
why but can be used in this example. For this kind of example, while 
-ciman is perfectly acceptable, -na is less acceptable. 
Another difference between these two connectives lies in the possibility 
of repetition of the same connectives. In English, only two sentences can 
be connected by contrastive connectives such as although and but while 
they are used in the same complex sentence. 
(34) a. * Although you may know, although Tom is tall, Bill is short. 
b. *You may know, but Tom is tall but Bill is short. 
(35) Although you may know, Tom is tall but Bill is short. 
The connective -na in Korean behaves quite similarly. It is not capable of 
connecting more than two sentences. 
(36) *ne-to al-kyess-una thorn-un khu-na pil-un cak-ta.1) 
You-too know-SUP-but Tom-CT tall-but Bill-CT short-DC 
'As you may know, Tom is tall but Bill is short.' 
Interestingly, if we replace -na with -ciman in (36) the sentence becomes 
acceptable. 
(37) ne-to al-kess-ciman thorn-un khu-ciman pH-un cak-ta. 
'As you may know, Tom is tall but Bill is short.' 
Unlike but in English, -ciman can connect three sentences as above. 
When this is the case, the first clause suffixed by -ciman is on a 
different layer of representation from a semantic or pragmatic point of 
1) One of the referees pointed out that if examples like (36) and (42) above are amended as to 
carry more formality, then the acceptability of these examples will increase. However, it 
still seems that the revised examples sound less acceptable than corresponding -ciman 
examples. 
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view. As for (37), the content in the first clause expresses the speaker's 
attitude towards the proposition in the following clauses rather than 
expressing a fact of the world. It does not matter whether the hearer 
already knows the fact stated in the following clauses. By using such an 
expression, the speaker is able to make it as if the following information 
was already available to both the speaker and the hearer. 
Structurally the clause under consideration is positioned outside of the 





As you may know Tom is tall but Bill is short 
This structural analysis is supported by two other pieces of evidence. 
First, when (37) is embedded in a sentence with the verb -ko hata QT 
'say', the -ciman clause has wide scope over -ko hata. 
(39) mianha-ciman kicha-ka imi ttena-ss-ta-ko hay-yo. 
Be sorry-but train-NM already leave-PST-DC-QT say-DC 
'I am sorry to say, but they say the train has already left: 
'*They say that they are sorry to say, but the train has already lefL' 
Secondly, when a tag question is used, the -ciman clause has a wide 
scope over the tag question, which is illustrated by the following example: 
(40) mianha-ciman kicha-ka imi ttena-ss-e-yo. kuleh-ciyo? 
Be so-Q 
'I am sorry to say, but the train has already left. Hasn't it?' 
'*1 am sorry to say, but the train has already left. Aren't !?' 
When -ciman clause is used as in (39) and (40), it seems that the -ciman 
clause does not provide any proposition that explicitly contrasts with the 
following clause. Instead, it signals the speaker's concessive attitude in 
uttering the following clause. By means of using this kind of clause, the 
speaker is able to soften the bluntness or impoliteness the content the 
following clause might bring about. For this use, the connective -(u)na 
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can not be used. The example (39) might receive the following kind of 
analysis, which has the characteristics of the denial of expectation use: 
(41) a. If the speaker was sorry to say that they said that the train 
had left, he would not say it. 
b. The speaker says that they said that the train had left. 
We can observe that the resultant clause in (41a) contrasts with (41b) and 
that the two propositions in (41) are derived ones from the -ciman clause 
and the second clause in (39) respectively. Hence, this is an instance of 
the denial of expectation use. Furthermore, I would like to argue that 
cases like (39) and (40) have additional characteristics to those of the 
denial of expectation cases, because the -ciman clauses in them have the 
function of softening the bluntness of the content of the following 
clauses. Hence, I would like to call the -ciman in this use the discoursal 
use. 
This difference seems to be further supported because -ciman is 
permissible when the second clause contains speech acts such as 
proposals, orders, and questions as shown in the following: 
(42) nuc-ess-?una/ ciman 
be late-PST-but 
ppaUi ka-ca/ -kela / -lkka? 
quickly go-PRI IM I QI leave 
'It is late, but let's gol gol shall we go?' 
It is argued that when the second clause involves a speech act, the 
connective is entitled to be termed a discourse connective because in that 
use, the statuses of the two clauses need not be equal (Lee, 2002a, 2002b). 
Accordingly, the meaning of the two suffixes discLlssed in this section 
would be represented as follows: 
Figure 3. The Scales of -na and -ciman in Korean 
Inference 
-na contrast denial of expectation 
-ciman contrast denial of expectation discoursal ] 
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The scales of the two suffixes overlap as far as the contrast use and the 
denial of expectation use are concerned. So, I shall examine only the 
-ciman scale for convenience. In the next section, I will pursue the 
possibility of expanding this scale with reference to the metalinguistic 
dimension discussed previously. 
8. Contrast and Negation on the Scale of Contrastive Connectives 
It was mentioned in the preceding sections that Korean employs 
different suffixes from -ciman or -na for the corrective use. As in 
English, the corrective use of but in Korean is preceded by a clause that 
is explicitly negated. For this use, the suffix -ko is used. Let me clarify 
this phenomenon by the following example: 
(43) mwun-ul ye-n salam-un apeci-ka an-i-kol*-cimanl*-na 
door-AC open-MD person-Top father-NM not-be-but 
n wuna-i-ess-ta. 
sister-be-PST-DC 
'The person who opened the door was not your father, but your 
sister.' 
The economist vs. businessman examples provided by Dascal and Katriel 
(1977) would be realized by different suffixes in Korean, similar to 
Hebrew, Spanish, or German. 
(44) a. ku-nun kyengceyhakca-nun ani-ciman/-na saepka-i-ta 
he-Top economist-Top not-but businessman-be-DC 
'He is not an economist but he is a businessman. (So he should 
be consulted.)' 
b. ku-nun kyengceyhakca-nun ani-ko/-la saepka-i-ta. 
'He is not an economist, but a businessman. (So he should not 
. be consulted.)' 
In Section 6, it was discussed that but in MN is regarded as the 
corrective use that involves more inference from the interlocutors. It has 
also been concluded that if the context permits, the construction that is 
not normally permissible for MN can be construed as metalinguistic. Let 
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me examine the metalinguistic cases with reference to the contrastive 
connectives in Korean. 
Based on the grammatical phenomena in (43) and (44), one may guess 
that the scale of English but presented in Figure 2 has a corresponding 
scale in Korean, one dimension of which is covered by -ciman and the 
corrective-metalingusitic dimension by -ko. However, the connective 
-ciman can be used in MN, though -ko would be equally or more common. 
(45) A: hankwuk-ey motoweyi-ka iss-ta. 
Korea-in motorway-NM be-DC 
'There are motorways in Korea.' 
B: hankwuk-ey motoweyi-nunl ka eps-cimanl ko kosoktolo-nunl ka 
iss-ta. 
Top/ NM not-be but highways Top/ NM be-DC 
'In Korea, there are not motorways, but highways.' 
In the preceding section, the connective -ciman is discussed only in 
terms of one dimension. The example in (45), however, suggests that the 
connective a t issue has to be addressed with reference to the other 
dimension towards the metalinguistic end. It should also be noted that 
the contrasted elements in (45B) can be suffixed either by the topic 
marker or the nominative marker. All these facts make it possible for us 
to represent the meaning of the suffi xes -ciman and -ko as follows: 
Figure 4. The Scale of -ciman and -ko in Korean (revised) 
Inference 
-ciman I contrast denial of expectation discoursal 
(corrective (-ko)) metalinguistic( -ko&-ciman) 
What could the reason be that -ciman is used both for denial of 
expectation use and for MN? As I argued before, this is beca use MN can 
be construed as a kind of denial of expectation. If we take (45B) as an 
example, the first conjunct would normally presuppose or imply that 
there are no motorways in Korea, whatever they are called. However, this 
presupposition or implication is denied or cancelled in the second 
conjunct. In this respect, denial of expectation cases and MN cases are 
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similar to each other. One might argue that -ciman is more oriented to 
the contrast-discoursal dimension than to the corrective-metalinguistic 
dimension. Then, the use of -ciman in metalinguistic interpretation could 
be accounted for satisfactorily with reference to the effect MN causes. As 
-ciman normally occurs in descriptive reading, the effect of MN could b~ 
increased if it is used for MN. That is, the rhetorical effect of MN 
becomes greater by disguising MN. However, this contention is rather 
speculative at this stage, because it is obvious that -ciman is also 
acceptable in MN, as we observe in (45). 
On the other hand, the corrective use and MN share the property that 
the second clause has the role of replacing the denied element in the first 
clause. I argue that in Korean the similarity between denial of 
expectation and MN is manifested by the use of -ciman, whereas that 
between the corrective use and MN by the connective -ko. 
9. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, the contrastive connectives have been discussed both in 
English and Korean. Whatever the representation on which they operate, 
the connectives are argued to retain the core meaning, i.e., contrast. One 
point worth recalling is that another dimension of scale has been 
introduced to account for the use of but in a metalinguistic environment. 
It is obviously true that MN is a type of denial of expectation. However, 
it has a more salient function than simple denial of expectation, i.e. 
creating a rhetorical effect. Also, while the denial of expectation occurs 
on a descriptive or denotational level, MN occurs on a metalinguistic 
level. That is, the level on which contrast occurs is of quite a different 
nature. This is why a new dimension is introduced. Korean contrastive 
connectives have also been discussed in comparison with the ubiquitous 
but. It has been concluded that Korean uses more complex methods to 
display the common properties between the denial of expectation and 
MN on the one hand, and those between the corrective use and MN on 
the other. 
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